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I. Introduction
Mandatory controls on greenhouse gases were noticeably absent from the climate 
change policy that President Bush announced in 2002, which instead placed heavy 
reliance on private voluntary efforts. 1  Specifically, Bush directed the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a program called “Climate Leaders” to encourage 
companies to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas emissions and directed the Department 
of Energy (DOE) to improve the effectiveness of an already existing voluntary 
greenhouse gas registry.2 Agencies implementing environmental policy have been 
employing voluntary approaches such as these for over a decade, but the Bush 
Administration has elevated this type of approach to a new status of importance by often 
relying principally on voluntary efforts in response to significant environmental concerns. 
Critics have questioned the environmental effectiveness of voluntary approaches,3 yet it 
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is unclear whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides interested members 
of the public the right to voice concerns and challenge agency decisions related to 
voluntary approaches through rulemakings and judicial review.  If the APA does not 
provide public participation rights when agencies decide to use voluntary approaches,
important environmental policy decisions may be shielded from public comment and 
judicial review, and a turn to widespread use of voluntary approaches may produce a 
deficit of public participation in environmental policymaking.
This Paper analyzes the application of the APA to voluntary approaches in 
environmental policy.  In choosing a voluntary approach, agencies deliberately decide not 
to issue mandatory regulations but instead to rely on voluntary participation in 
furtherance of the agency’s goals, often providing various types of incentives to facilitate 
the voluntary efforts.  One long-standing example of a voluntary approach is the Energy 
Star program, a voluntary labeling scheme established by the EPA in 1992 that 
encourages the use of energy-efficient products.4 Although voluntary approaches have 
been used for many years, until recently agencies had generally used them as 
complements or precursors to mandatory regulations.  In contrast, the Bush 
Administration has in many circumstances promoted reliance on voluntary efforts as a 
preferred alternative to mandatory regulation.  The climate change policy is one example 
in which the Administration has responded to environmental concerns principally by 
looking towards voluntary approaches. In addition, the Department of the Interior has 
often favored its “cooperative conservation” programs, in which the agency provides 
(2001), at http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/avoluntary.asp; Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental 
Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1286-87 (1995).
4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, History of Energy Star, at
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history.
incentives for voluntary conservation efforts, over the use of regulatory controls to 
achieve conservation goals.5
Voluntary approaches raise new and complex administrative law issues, which are 
important to address given the rising importance of these approaches in environmental 
policy.  Caught between conceptions of agency action and inaction, voluntary approaches 
blur the legal categories used to apply the APA’s public participation requirements. 
Agencies might be viewed as taking “action” through the implementation of voluntary 
approaches in that the agency identifies and acknowledges issues of concern, signals to 
private actors that action is desired, provides incentives to encourage voluntary efforts, 
measures progress towards objectives, and commits staff, funding, and other resources to 
the endeavor.  However, decisions to use voluntary approaches might alternatively be 
viewed as “inaction” because they are after all a deliberate choice by an agency to refrain 
from regulating.  They do not create any restrictions on private action, ultimately leaving 
control in the hands of private actors and taking the risk that no progress will be achieved 
greater than if the agency had done nothing at all. 
The application of the APA’s rulemaking and judicial review provisions to 
voluntary approaches will produce different results depending upon how these 
approaches are characterized.   The APA requires that agencies hold rulemakings when 
they create “rules” but provides certain exceptions to this requirement, notably for 
“general statements of policy,” which lack binding force on the public and the agency.6
Although voluntary approaches by definition do not bind the public, the agency could 
5 See John Tierney, Trying for Balance at Interior Dept., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A26; U.S. 
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conceivably bind itself in some way through its implementation of the approach.  The 
presence of a binding norm, however, would seem to not be possible unless there is at 
least some “action” to which the agency can be bound.  Therefore, the characterization of 
the agency’s decision to use a voluntary approach as action or inaction has implications 
for whether the decision is classified as a policy statement under the APA, and thus for 
the right to a rulemaking.   In addition, the APA expressly applies different standards for 
substantive judicial depending on whether action or inaction is being challenged, and the 
Supreme Court has also held that under some circumstances agency inaction is 
presumptively committed to agency discretion by law.7 The legal characterization of 
these approaches thus has important consequences for public participation rights under 
the APA, yet so far the question seems to have escaped courts and scholarship.
The tension over the appropriate legal characterization of voluntary approaches is 
further complicated by the political debate over these approaches.  Agencies often 
highlight voluntary programs to show the public that action is being taken in response to 
environmental concerns.  President Bush and agency officials such as Secretary of the 
Interior Gale Norton have portrayed voluntary approaches as genuine, effective responses 
to significant environmental concerns such as climate change and habitat destruction.  
Such manifestations would support a conclusion that voluntary approaches should be 
considered agency “action.”  Conversely, environmentalists often challenge voluntary 
approaches as lacking in substance and incapable of effectively addressing environmental 
problems, which would suggest that that these approaches are closer to “inaction” than 
action.  These positions may result in paradoxes for both environmentalists wishing to 
challenge the programs and agencies wishing to defend the programs.  Environmental 
7
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advocates will more effectively be able to argue that they are entitled to rulemakings and 
judicial review under the APA by showing that agencies are taking action through 
voluntary approaches, contrary to what environmentalists may claim as a substantive 
matter.  And agencies wishing to avoid rulemakings and receive deference in judicial 
review will find it useful to take a position that, contrary to their public manifestations, 
decisions to use voluntary approaches are essentially the equivalent of inaction.
Given the unresolved legal status of voluntary approaches to environmental 
policy, this Paper suggests that it will often be appropriate for courts to look to the 
agency’s public portrayal of the approach to determine its legal characterization for 
purposes of the APA -- specifically, to determine whether the approach qualifies as action 
or inaction to determine whether judicial review is available, and whether the agency has 
created a binding norm to determine whether a rulemaking is required.   Otherwise, 
agencies may ironically escape the APA processes designed to make them accountable 
based on a position that is contrary to the political message they send to the public.  The 
result would further be a shielding of important and often controversial environmental
issues from public scrutiny. The public would lose the right to participate in or challenge 
the significant decisions by agencies to use voluntary approaches rather than mandatory 
regulation, which will benefit the targets of regulation, who will usually prefer voluntary 
policies, while disadvantaging the beneficiaries of regulation.  Other important 
implementation decisions as well, such as the level of environmental improvement sought
and the incentives granted to encourage voluntary efforts, will not be subject to the APA.  
Even more fundamentally, a large-scale shift towards voluntary approaches would have 
the potential to produce a deficit of public participation in environmental policy, with the 
real losers being environmental public interest advocates.  
Part II of this Paper describes the voluntary approach paradigm that is the focus of 
the Paper, traces the history of the federal government’s use of voluntary programs in 
environmental policy, discusses possible rationales for the use of voluntary approaches, 
and explores the agency’s role in facilitating voluntary efforts.  Part III discusses the 
application of the APA’s rulemaking and judicial review provisions to voluntary 
approaches.  Part IV discusses how looking to the agency’s public portrayal of voluntary 
approaches can resolve the tension over the proper legal characterization and alleviate 
accountability concerns.
II. Voluntary Approaches in Federal Environmental Policy
The voluntary approaches that are the focus of this Paper have three 
characteristics: 1) reliance on voluntary actions taken by private parties, rather than 
actions mandated by regulation, 2) government involvement facilitating voluntary efforts, 
and 3) no direct relation to existing legal requirements.  The first element emphasizes that
these approaches impose no mandatory controls on private action and rely solely on 
voluntary private efforts over which the agency exercises no regulatory control.   The 
second element distinguishes these programs from the many purely private initiatives that 
seek to further environmental goals through voluntary actions.  Examples of such private 
initiatives include the Chemical Manufacturer Association’s Responsible Care Program, 
which governs the products and practices of the industry’s members, and the ISO 14000 
series, a set of international environmental management standards under which 
companies may voluntarily become certified.8  In contrast, the federal government 
administers the programs discussed in this Paper.  
Finally, the last element is meant to distinguish voluntary programs from 
approaches that release regulated parties from mandatory requirements in return for 
compliance with alternative agreements negotiated with the government.  Examples of 
such “contractarian” approaches include Project XL, an experimental program launched 
by the EPA under the Clinton administration that allowed regulated parties to negotiate 
alternatives to pollution control requirements, and Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) 
carried out under the Endangered Species Act, which immunize landowners from 
prosecution for “incidental takes” of endangered species in return for agreements to 
implement conservation plans on their land.9  These types of approaches, which scholars 
have referred to as “contractarian regulation”10 and “regulatory penalty default” rules,11
may seem similar to the approaches that are the focus of this Paper. Participation in both 
types of approaches is voluntary, and both may seek to encourage “beyond compliance”
behavior.  The crucial difference, however, is that approaches such as Project XL and 
HCPs have regulatory defaults that provide the incentive for regulated parties to 
participate in the program, whereas in purely voluntary programs, there is no relaxation 
of mandatory standards in exchange for efforts, making participation truly “voluntary.”
8 See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 813, 831-32 (2000) (describing the Responsible Care Program and ISO 14000 series).  See generally
Errol Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You 
May Think, 31 ENV. L. REP. 10162 (2001) (highlighting the trend towards private environmental 
initiatives).
9 David A. Dana, The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
35, 38-42 (2000); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970-75 (2003).
10 Dana, supra note 9, at 36 (Under the contractarian approach, “regulators contractually commit not to 
enforce some requirements that are formally applicable to the regulated entities in return for the regulated 
entities’ contractual commitments to take measures not required under existing formal law.”).
11 Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 944 (“A regulatory penalty default is a harsh or quasi-punitive regulatory 
requirement that applies as the default rule if parties fail to reach a satisfactory alternative arrangement.”).
Drawing such a distinction is necessary because the release of parties from existing 
regulatory requirements raises different legal issues than purely voluntary programs.
The voluntary approach paradigm seems yet to have been studied in depth by 
scholarship, perhaps because the environmental benefits of these approaches have been 
considered “marginal.”12  Other scholarly paradigms encompass some types of voluntary 
approaches but do not require voluntariness as an essential characteristic.13  It has become
important, however, to examine voluntary approaches in their own right more closely, 
due to their recently elevated status in federal environmental policy and the unique legal 
issues they raise.  This section will therefore attempt to fill in part of the gap in the 
scholarship by tracing the history of the federal government’s use of voluntary 
approaches in environmental policy, exploring the various rationales agencies may have 
in choosing voluntary approaches, and discussing the roles of agencies in facilitating
voluntary efforts.  
A. A Short History of Voluntary Approaches in Federal Environmental Policy
In 1991, the EPA for the first time experimented with a program that sought
purely voluntary efforts in furtherance of an environmental goal.14 EPA’s first voluntary 
12 See MAZUREK, supra note 3, at 7 (“As a number of organizations and researchers have concluded, EPA’s 
voluntary programs for the most part are ‘marginal’ to the command-and-control system”). 
13
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are not limited to purely voluntary approaches.  See Orts, supra note 3, at 1252-55 (describing reflexive law 
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Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (describing collaborative 
governance model); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from 
Command to Self-Control, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998) (describing self-regulation model); 
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14 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACHIEVEMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A PROGRESS 
REPORT THROUGH 2000 2 (2002), http://www.epa.gov/partners/resource/PartnershipReport.pdf [hereinafter 
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initiative, known as the “33/50 Program,” invited selected companies to participate in the 
program by pursuing emission reductions in seventeen high-priority toxic chemicals of 
thirty-three percent by 1992 and fifty percent by 1995.15  Although opinions differed on 
the success of the program,16 this first experimental venture has since evolved into a 
diverse array of over forty voluntary programs sponsored by the EPA in which over 
11,000 organizations participate.17 The DOI and DOE have also been facilitating 
voluntary environmental efforts for over a decade. The DOI established its “Partners for 
Fish and Wildlife” program in 1987, and this program is now one of several “cooperative 
conservation” initiatives administered  by the agency.18  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
required the DOE to establish a voluntary greenhouse gas registry, and the agency is 
currently in the process of revising guidelines for the registry through notice-and-
comment procedures as part of Bush’s climate change policy.19
The ascendancy of voluntary programs occurred as part of much larger reform 
effort in environmental law.  By the 1990s, many had come to agree that the “first 
generation” of environmental law, which functioned mainly through a patchwork of 
command-and-control statutes , suffered from significant flaws and was incapable on its 
15 Id.; Orts, supra note 3, at 1284.
16 Orts, supra note 3, 1284-85.
17
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Partners for the Environment, at http://www.epa.gov/partners/; 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Partners for the Environment: List of Programs, at 
http://www.epa.gov/partners/programs/index.htm (listing over forty voluntary partnership programs).  See 
also MAZUREK, supra note 3, at 20 (graph illustrating growth of participation in EPA voluntary programs).
18 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program—Our Partners, at
http://partners.fws.gov/What_we_do/overview.html; .U.S. Department of the Interior, supra note 5. 
19 General Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,204, (proposed Dec. 5, 
2003) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 300) [hereinafter Guidelines for Voluntary Reporting].
own to carry environmental progress to the next level.20 Richard Stuart aptly summarizes 
the by now familiar criticisms of command-and-control:
It has been criticized on the grounds that it is unduly rigid, cumbersome, and 
costly; fails to accommodate and stimulate innovation in resource-efficient means 
of pollution prevention; fails to prioritize risk management wisely; is patchwork 
in character, focusing in an uncoordinated fashion on different environmental 
problems in different environmental media and often ignoring functional and 
ecosystem interdependencies; and relies on a remote centralized bureaucratic 
apparatus that lacks adequate democratic accountability.21
Responding to the push for change, the Clinton administration initiated an effort to 
“reinvent” the federal government’s environmental policy.22  This initiative resulted in 
the release of a report in 1995 entitled “Reinventing Environmental Regulation” that 
highlighted the need for a more collaborative approach to environmental policy. 23  EPA 
proceeded to experiment with a dizzying number of “reinvention” initiatives,24 but 
voluntary programs were not a main focus of these efforts.  Instead, the “cornerstones” of 
reinvention were the Common Sense Initiative and Project XL,25 which both operated 
under the shadow of existing regulatory requirements.  The innovation of these programs 
was to allow for more flexible compliance by giving regulated entities the opportunity to 
design alternatives to existing mandatory requirements.26
Still, new voluntary programs quietly continued to spring up, even if they were 
not the main thrust of the reinvention effort.  “Green Lights,” a program encouraging 
20 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21 (2001); 
Case, supra note 13, at 3 (2001). 
21 Stewart, supra note 20, at 21.  For discussions of the debate over command-and-control regulation in 
environmental law, see id. at 27-38; Case, supra note 13, at 27-32; Steinzor, supra note 13, at 113-118.
22 Case, supra note 13, at 33-34.
23 Id. at 39-40.
24
 In 1995, the EPA announced a set of twenty-five reinvention efforts.  Robert W. Hahn et al.,
Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.  377, 397 
(2003).  In 2001, one author estimated that more than sixty reinvention actions were in progress.  Case, 
supra note 13, at 40. 
25
 Case, supra note 13, at 41.
26 Id. at 41-44.
businesses to voluntarily install energy-efficient lighting soon followed the 30/50 
program in 1991.27   In 1992, two new programs began that have enjoyed sustained 
success into the present day, namely, “Energy Star” and “Design for the Environment.”28
Energy Star uses a voluntary labeling scheme to promote use of energy-efficient 
products, while under Design for the Environment, partners work with the EPA to 
integrate designs that reduce pollution into industry practices.29  The growth in voluntary 
programs during the Clinton administration continued with the introduction of programs 
such as “Waste Wise” and “Water Alliances for Voluntary Efficiency” (WAVE), 
resulting in the establishment of over twenty-five EPA partnership programs by 1998.30
Voluntary approaches took on a higher profile in reinvention efforts with the 
release of a new report in 1999 by a federal government task force formed to reinvigorate 
the “floundering” reinvention agenda.31  The “Aiming for Excellence” report outlined an 
environmental stewardship initiative calling for renewed efforts towards facilitation of 
voluntary actions.32  The stewardship initiative contained two main goals – one was to 
increase compliance assistance, but the primary emphasis was on the goal of encouraging 
organizations to voluntarily exceed regulatory standards.33  One proposed way to promote 
beyond-compliance behavior was through the use of incentives and voluntary programs; 
the report highlighted the need to continue experimentation in search of effective 
27 Orts, supra note 3, at 1285.
28 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENERGY STAR—THE POWER TO PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1 (2003), 
http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/energy_star_report_aug_2003.pdf; U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Design for the Environment: Program History, at
http://www.epa.gov/dfe/about/history.htm [hereinafter DfE Program History].
29 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 4; DfE Program History, supra note 28.
30 Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with the New 
American Environmentality, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 18-20 (1998) (listing EPA voluntary programs 
established to date).
31
 Case, supra note 13, at 5.
32 Id. at 4-5, 65-69.
33 Id. at 60.
incentives and to “improve the accessibility and increase the potential”  of the EPA’s 
voluntary partnership programs.34
Use of voluntary approaches has continued from the Clinton administration into 
the current Bush administration, but these policy instruments seem to have been elevated 
to a new status since Bush has taken office.  Until the past few years, voluntary 
approaches were essentially used as complements or precursors to mandatory regulations, 
and as such their use was not controversial.35 Policymakers in the Bush administration, 
however, instead have sometimes relied on voluntary approaches as the primary approach 
for addressing environmental issues.  Agency officials have promoted voluntary 
approaches as solutions to particular problems, such as climate change, as well as more 
universally as a generally preferable policy approach.
With the announcement of a climate change policy that rejected mandatory 
controls and instead relied on voluntary efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions , Bush 
seemed to usher in a new era of unprecedented importance for voluntary programs.  
Presented with a compelling environmental concern, intense controversy over whether 
legal controls were necessary, and strong national and international pressures, Bush did 
not respond with decisive intention either to enact mandatory regulations or refrain from 
action, but instead took the position that reliance on voluntary efforts was an appropriate 
response.  The EPA-sponsored program “Climate Leaders” was one specific initiative 
launched by the climate change policy.36  Under this program, participating companies 
34 Id. at 65, 68.
35
 The EPA stated in 2000 that its partnership programs were “not a substitute for well-designed regulations 
and vigilant enforcement, but they are an important complement to regulations that enable EPA to work 
with those who wish to improve their environmental performance beyond what is required by regulations.”  
ACHIEVEMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIP, supra note 14, at 3.  See MAZUREK, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing 
voluntary programs as “pilot programs” to “improve how EPA manages pollution.”).
36 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 2
agree to complete a company-wide inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, report 
inventory data annually, and enter into discussions with the EPA to develop an 
“aggressive” emissions reduction goal to be achieved over five to ten years.37 Another
initiative involved enhancing the voluntary greenhouse gas registry already established 
under 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act, which had seen limited participation.38 DOE 
published proposed revised guidelines for the voluntary registry in the Federal Register 
on December 5, 2003 and is currently soliciting public comment as of this writing.39
Beyond the specific context of climate change as well, the words and actions of 
high-ranking officials in the Bush administration have brought voluntary approaches to 
the forefront of environmental policy.  Under what President Bush and Secretary of the 
Interior Gale Norton call the “new environmentalism,” the favored approach is 
encouraging local cooperation in voluntary conservation efforts through the use of 
incentives, rather than governing through mandatory regulations.40  For example, 
Secretary Norton has promoted the benefits of restoring wetlands through “cooperative 
conservation efforts, partnerships, and voluntary programs” in which the federal 
government provides funds and technical assistance to private parties to rehabilitate 
wetlands, as opposed to protection through traditional regulation of wetlands under the 
Clean Water Act.41  Similarly, the EPA has sought to replace previously mandatory 
37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Leaders: Partnership Agreement, 
http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/pdf/agreement.pdf (contains commitments required of program 
participants).
38 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 2. 
39
 Guidelines for Voluntary Reporting, supra note 19.
40 Tierney, supra note 5.  See also, Gale A. Norton, Helping Citizens Conserve Their Own Land—and 
America’s, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at A17.
41 Gale Norton and Ann Veneman, There’s More Than One Way to Protect Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2003, at A25.  
controls with reliance on voluntary efforts,42 and recently appointed EPA Administrator 
Michael Leavitt has proclaimed collaboration with private interests to be his preferred 
approach.43
B. Rationales of Voluntary Approaches
1. Environmental Goals
Agencies may rely on private voluntary efforts to pursue a variety of 
environmental goals.  Voluntary efforts may produce direct environmental benefits, such 
as pollution reduction or habitat restoration.  Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, for 
instance, is a direct environmental benefit that the EPA encourages through the Climate 
Leaders program. As of April 2004, 54 companies have joined the program, including 
General Motors, Gap Inc., and IBM, and some have set reduction goals.44  The DOI’s 
cooperative conservation projects also seek to achieve direct environmental benefits by 
providing incentives for voluntary conservation efforts on private lands through cost-
share grants.45 DOI administers the funds through a number of programs, ranging from 
newer initiatives such as the Landowner Incentive Program46 and the Private Stewardship 
Grants Program47 to more established programs such as “Partners for Fish and Wildlife,” 
42 See Editorial Desk, New Threats to Clean Water, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at A16 (noting that 
proposed changes to Clean Water Act regulation would stress “voluntary efforts.”) 
43 Michael Janofsy, Nominee for E.P.A. Defends His Job as Utah Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at 
A1.
44
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Leaders Partners, 
http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/partners.html#agreement.
45
 U.S. Department of the Interior, supra note 5. 
46 U.S. Department of the Interior, Promoting Partnerships for Conservation: The Landowner Incentive 
Program, http://www.doi.gov/news/landincent.pdf.
47 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Private Stewardship Grants Program, 
http://endangered.fws.gov/grants/private_stewardship/index.html.
which since 1987 has been offering technical and financial assistance to private 
landowners to voluntarily restore fish and wildlife habitats on their land.48
Agencies may also aim through voluntary approaches to heighten environmental 
consciousness in business practices and consumer purchases.  Under the Energy Star 
program, the EPA and DOE accomplish this goal by increasing awareness of energy 
efficiency among industries and consumers.49  Since the beginning of the program in 
1992, the agencies have established standards for displaying the Energy Star label for 35 
product categories.50  Private actors may participate in Energy Star through 
manufacturing, marketing, or selling products with the Energy Star label and by 
promoting energy efficiency through other efforts.51  The EPA claims that in 2002, 
Energy Star prevented greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to those from 14 million 
vehicles.52
For almost all environmental issues, uncertainty exists regarding the extent of the 
risk and the most effective approach for responding to the concern.  Agencies may use 
voluntary approaches to collect information and experiment with new approaches in 
order to produce more informed and innovative environmental policy solutions.  Under 
voluntary partnerships, agencies and private entities can collaborate to perform research, 
experiment with new approaches, or share information on best environmental practices.   
In EPA’s “Design for the Environment” program, for example, the agency collaborates 
with private industries to design products, production processes and technologies that will 
48
 From 1987 to 2002, Partners for Fish and Wildlife restored over 600,000 acres of wetlands and over one 
million acres of prairie and other uplands, providing restored habitat for many species of wildlife.  U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Service, supra note 18.
49
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 4
50 Id.
51 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Energy Star Partner Resources, at 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.pt_index.   
52 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 28, at 1. 
reduce pollution and waste fewer resources.53 To accomplish their goals, Design for the 
Environment partnerships identify pollution prevention opportunities, evaluate the costs 
and benefits of these alternative approaches, disseminate the information produced to the 
entire industry, and encourage the use of this information to further environmental 
improvement.54
2. Theoretical Models
Agencies may also turn to voluntary approaches based on particular theories of 
how environmental policy goals are best achieved.  The search for “next generation” 
environmental solutions has given rise to a prolific amount of scholarship proposing 
alternatives to the conventional command-and-control structure.55 Although there seem 
to be no suggested theoretical models that require the exclusive use of voluntary 
approaches or look upon them as sufficient on their own to sustain environmental 
progress, some models may still provide theoretical justifications for the use of voluntary 
approaches.
Underlying many of the “next generation” approaches to environmental policy is 
an emphasis on collaboration between the government and various stakeholders.56
Environmental policymaking generally takes place in a highly adversarial atmosphere, 
perhaps even “the most combative regulatory arena in American politics.”57  While 
raising complicated accountability issues, collaborative approaches may produce benefits 
by harnessing expertise outside of the government and instilling a greater ethic of private 
53
 Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction: Second Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. 
U. L. REV.  1, 7-8.
54 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, About DfE, at http://www.epa.gov/dfe/about/index.htm.
55
 For a comprehensive summary of “next generation” environmental scholarship, see generally, Stewart, 
supra note 20.
56 See Case, supra note 13, at 36.
57 Id. at 16.  See id. at 16-26 (describing the adversarial nature of environmental politics).   
responsibility for environmental protection than could be achieved through merely 
requiring regulated entities to follow mandates which they had no role in creating.58
Under the model of “collaborative governance,” interested and affected parties work 
together in developing solutions, with the agency serving to facilitate collaboration 
among stakeholders by providing incentives for participation and information sharing, 
technical resources, and funding.59  The outcomes reached through collaborative 
negotiations are not necessarily voluntary for compliance purposes, but the notion of 
collaboration is often a strong force driving voluntary programs. The EPA has noted that 
“enforcement actions…by their very nature often result in adversarial relationships with 
limited trust,” while “[i]n a non-regulatory program, the regulatory agency and regulated 
community typically work more closely together to achieve a common goal.”60 Secretary 
Norton has been a strong proponent of collaborative approaches, promoting what she 
refers to as the “four C’s” – “communication, consultation, and cooperation, all in the 
service of conservation.”61
The “reflexive law” model provides another possible rationale for the use of 
voluntary approaches.  Under reflexive law theory, the purpose of the law is to encourage 
organizations to internalize environmental norms rather than to directly control their
external actions.62 Rather than issuing mandatory regulations, therefore, a reflexive law 
approach views organizations as essentially self-regulating and focuses instead on ways 
58 See id., at 36.
59
 Freeman, supra note 13, at 22.
60 Approaches to an Integrated Framework for Management and Disposal of Low-Activity Radioactive 
Waste: Request for Comment, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,120-01, 65,149 (Nov. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Approaches to 
an Integrated Framework].
61
 Tierney, supra note 5. 
62 Stewart, supra note 20, at 127.  See also, Orts, supra note 3, at 1232.
for the government to provide incentives and support for the internalization of norms.63
Exchange of information is essential under reflexive law, because knowledge of actions 
and their consequences leads to dialogue among stakeholders that furthers the 
internalization of environmental norms.64  Thus, one significant contribution the 
government can make is to ensure that the relevant information is generated and 
exchanged among stakeholders.65 Voluntary programs can promote reflexive law’s aims 
by encouraging companies to consider the environmental impact of their actions and 
share information about their environmental performance with the government and the 
public.66 For example,  reporting schemes such as the voluntary registry for greenhouse 
gas emissions established pursuant to 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act can serve 
reflexive law purposes because the release of such information encourages dialogue 
between the companies and larger society over the optimal level of environmental 
performance. Environmental labeling schemes such as Energy Star are another type of
voluntary reflexive law strategy.67 One important caveat, however, is that even 
supporters of reflexive law do not view it as a complete substitute for command-and-
control but rather as an important complementary approach.68
Voluntary programs may also respond to the criticisms that have been weighed 
against the predominant command-and-control structure of environmental policy. They 
may mitigate problems stemming from the uncertainty inherent in environmental 
problems and the inefficiencies associated with command-and-control by allowing more 
63 See Stewart, supra note 20, at 127-28.
64 Id. at 131.
65 Id.
66 See Orts, supra note 3, at 1284-86 (“Voluntary programs are in some important ways reflexive” although 
they “do not go far enough.”).   
67 Id. at 1271-72.
68 Stewart, supra note 20, at 133-34; Orts, supra note 3, at 1234.
flexibility than would be possible under pure command-and-control regulation.  
Continuous adaptation in environmental policy is necessary due to the uncertainties 
involved, yet one of the prime complaints that has emerged from “next generation” 
scholarship is that the current command-and-control structure chills innovation.69
Voluntary approaches may respond to uncertainty by keeping efforts flexible and open to 
experimentation in the face of scientific, technological, and regulatory uncertainties, with 
the possibility of moving towards mandatory controls in the future. Consistent with this 
purpose, voluntary programs have often been used as “pilots” to forward the development 
of more permanent policies.70 Another frequent criticism of command-and-control is that 
by mandating in detailed manner the steps regulated parties must take to satisfy 
environmental law requirements, command-and-control regulations force parties to 
comply with standards in ways that might not be cost-efficient and may preclude the 
possibility of less costly compliance that accomplishes the same or even superior 
environmental performance.71  Voluntary approaches may serve to address such 
concerns; with no legal requirements in place, the parties will obviously have unlimited 
flexibility in meeting the desired goals.  Choosing a voluntary approach based solely on 
promoting compliance flexibility is of questionable logic, however, since the flexibility 
concern could also be addressed simply by setting mandatory environmental standards 
and allowing regulated entities as much flexibility as appropriate in meeting those goals.  
This was in fact the theory behind Project XL and other “contractarian” approaches that 
provided regulated parties additional flexibility in meeting requirements.
69 Steinzor, supra note 13, at 118.
70 See MAZUREK, supra note 3 at 6-7.
71 Stewart, supra note 20, at 31 (“[A] serious problem with the existing regulatory system is that it is highly 
inefficient and wastes vast amounts of scarce societal resources.”).
3. Legal and Political Constraints
In pursuing voluntary approaches, agencies may also be responding to legal or 
political constraints on their authority to issue mandatory regulations.  Congress may not 
have granted legal authority to the agency to issue mandatory regulations, or legal 
authority may be controversial.  For example, the EPA currently takes the position the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) does not give it authority to regulate greenhouse gases.72  At the 
same time that the EPA denied a petition for a rulemaking to introduce mandatory
controls, however, it emphasized its separate authority to pursue non-binding approaches: 
Lack of CAA authority to impose GHG control requirements does not leave the 
Federal Government powerless to take sensible measured steps to address the 
global climate change issue….The CAA and other statutes…authorize, and EPA 
and other agencies have established, nonregulatory programs that provide 
effective and appropriate means of addressing global climate change while 
scientific uncertainties are addressed.73
As another example, the DOI would not have the authority under the Endangered Species 
Act to mandate many of the conservation plans on private lands it achieves through 
collaboration with landowners.74
When legal authority does exist, agencies may still face political constraints and 
pursue voluntary efforts out of a reluctance to impose the economic cost of mandatory 
regulations. There may be a judgment that new regulations or increasing standards in 
response to a particular problem would not be desirable or efficient.  Perhaps the risk is 
small, thought to be predominantly managed by existing regulation or considered too 
72 Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922-02, 52,925 (Sept. 
8, 2003) (denial of petition for rulemaking) (hereinafter Control of Emissions). EPA’s claim that it lacks 
CAA authority to regulate greenhouse gases is highly contested; almost 50,000 comments were submitted 
on the petition for rulemaking.  Id. at 52924.
73
 Id. at 52,931 (emphasis added).  A description of the federal government’s non-regulatory efforts to 
address climate change follow this quote.  Id. at 52,931-52,933. 
74
 Section 9 of the ESA provides authority only to prevent “takes” on private lands.  Endangered Species 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). 
costly to regulate in a uniform and binding manner.75  Certain entities may be positioned 
to make improvements at relatively little cost, while imposing new obligations on entire 
industries would come at a large price.  In those types of circumstances, it may make 
policy sense for the agency to avoid mandatory controls but use voluntary programs to 
provide incentives encouraging companies that can meet heightened standards relatively 
easily to do so,.   
C. Agency Roles in Facilitating Voluntary Efforts
One might ask what the purpose of agency involvement is in voluntary 
approaches, since private parties are obviously free to take positive environmental actions 
even without official government encouragement. .If the role of agencies is considered 
insignificant, voluntary approaches might well be characterized as inaction for legal 
purposes.  An understanding of the roles agencies play in facilitating voluntary efforts 
therefore is important in considering the legal status of voluntary approaches.  
Priority setting is one role agencies serve in voluntary approaches.  At the outset
in establishing voluntary programs, the agency identifies an area in which voluntary 
actions would be beneficial. Agencies are in a better position than private companies to 
determine environmental priorities because they have the expertise to know what 
environmental needs exist that are not currently addressed by mandatory regulations and 
to set voluntary standards at appropriate levels.  In addition, agencies are more likely to 
center voluntary initiatives around issues that are of concern to the public; even if 
agencies do not hold rulemakings to solicit public comment on their decisions to use 
voluntary approaches, they are still indirectly accountable through the President and 
75 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE 11-19 (1993) (discussing inefficiencies of 
regulating small risks).
Congress.  In contrast, when corporations make environmental efforts without 
government involvement, they are more likely to respond to market pressures without 
systematically evaluating the greatest environmental needs.  Corporations can certainly 
make positive environmental contributions by setting goals independent of government 
recommendations, but agencies are in a better position to determine priorities for 
widespread voluntary initiatives.
After the program is established, the agency continues to contribute through its 
role as a central figure.  Many voluntary programs require more than just isolated 
voluntary efforts to be workable; there are often important organizational and 
coordinating functions that the agency must undertake.  As central figures, agencies may 
perform various tasks such as collecting information, developing guidelines and 
standards, measuring performance, tracking progress towards goals, and modifying
approaches when necessary.  These types of agency actions will be especially important 
in collaborative efforts such as Design for the Environment and in programs that require 
coordinating the efforts of a large number of participants, such as the 1605(b) greenhouse 
gas registry.  
The devotion of resources by agencies is also important.  The tasks that agencies 
perform to encourage voluntary efforts require a substantial investment of time, staff and 
funding.  Environmental non-profits usually do not have the resources to devote to such 
comprehensive efforts, and private companies will often not consider the investment to 
unilaterally develop new environmental approaches worth the cost.  Agencies thus can 
serve an important function by devoting the resources necessary to create “ready-made” 
voluntary approaches for companies to follow and by continuing to measure results and 
modify approaches when appropriate.  Such an allocation of resources will encourage 
private entities to engage in voluntary efforts by making such efforts less costly.  In 
addition to providing resources for the development of approaches, agencies may also 
sometimes directly fund the environmental improvements, as in the DOI’s cooperative 
conservation programs. In 2003,  DOI awarded $12.9 million in grants to fund projects 
ranging from invasive species eradication to habitat restoration, involving 749 
“partners.”76
The risk of voluntary approaches is obviously that private parties may not 
“volunteer” to the necessary extent.77 Importantly then, agencies also provide incentives 
for participation in voluntary programs.  In promoting its voluntary partnership programs, 
the EPA appeals to the direct benefits companies can receive from participation – mainly 
cost savings, public recognition and technical assistance.78 Public recognition is an 
important incentive that agencies have a large role in facilitating. Agencies may simply 
recognize companies as program participants, or may establish minimum of criteria for 
recognition.  For companies wishing to gain a more advantageous market position as a 
result of their environmental efforts, agencies can establish consistent criteria for making 
comparisons among companies, measure the performance of participants to ensure their 
adherence to standards, and provide the credibility to substantiate environmental claims 
76
 U.S. Department of the Interior, supra note 5. 
77
 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Steinzor, supra note 13, at 150-168.
78 See e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Partners for the Environment: Boosting Your Bottom 
Line, http://www.epa.gov/partners/boosting. Some scholars still remain skeptical that the government by 
itself is capable of creating a context in which corporations will voluntarily seek higher standards, arguing 
that the government cannot easily replicate that the factors that motivate superior environmental 
performance.  One commentator has concluded:
the most extraordinary examples of corporate environmentalism are initiated at the highest levels 
in a corporation by people who possess far-sighted vision of how to position their firms 
strategically in response to social and economic trends….[I]t is beyond the capacity of government 
to consciously produce such leadership, as grateful it may be when such people emerge.78
Steinzor, supra note 13, at 163.
by companies of which consumers might otherwise be skeptical.. Agencies also provide 
avenues for sharing the achievements of program participants with the public.  When the 
recognition relates to specific products, as in Energy Star, the endorsement can come in 
the form of a label displayed on the product, or when the goal is to recognize the 
company as a whole, the recognition may come through press releases and posting of 
information on agency web sites, among other possible methods.79 Another incentive 
that agencies commonly provide through voluntary programs is technical assistance.  
Environmental improvements, such as waste reduction, water conservation, or increased 
energy efficiency, may result in cost savings to companies.80 Through their expertise, 
agencies can assist companies in achieving their environmental goals.81 Technical 
assistance may range from providing information on waste reduction techniques to 
developing a methodology for recording greenhouse gas emissions.82
III. Application of the APA to Voluntary Approaches
A. Application of the APA’s Rulemaking Requirements
79
 For example, the Climate Leaders program issues press releases and gives participants recognition on the 
agency’s web page.  See e.g., Press Release, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Ten Major 
Corporations Pledge Greenhouse Gas Reductions (Jan. 13, 2004), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/df3979e129d138c485256
e1a0060e213?OpenDocument; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Partner GHG Goals,
http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/goals.html.
80 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Partners for the Environment: Why Join?, at
http://www.epa.gov/partners/benefits/index.htm.
81 Id.
82 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Waste Wise: Preserving Resources, Preventing Waste, at
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/reduce/wstewise/index.htm (provides links to information on EPA’s 
Waste Wise program, which assists companies with waste reduction efforts); U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Climate Leaders: Overview, at http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/overview.html
(stating that program provides companies with “technical assistance to develop a greenhouse gas inventory 
and develop an inventory management plan”). 
When issuing rules, agencies must conduct a “rule making” in accordance with 
Section 553 of the APA.83  Specifically, agencies must publish notice of the proposed 
rulemaking, provide opportunity for interested parties to participate in the rulemaking 
through submission of written comments, and incorporate a statement of basis and 
purpose in the rules adopted.84  These requirements are jointly known as “notice-and-
comment” procedures.  A rule promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures is 
considered a “legislative” rule and is given the same force of law as statutes.85 A 
strikingly large proportion of agency rules, however, escape APA rulemaking 
requirements; rulemaking in fact is “in relative terms a rare occurrence” compared with 
the volume of agency rules not issued through notice-and-comment.86 To illustrate, 
according to one anecdote the Federal Aviation Administration rules issued through 
rulemakings occupied about two inches of shelf space, while the corresponding guidance 
materials not produced through rulemakings took up over forty feet, and such a ratio is 
typical.87  This reality exists because the APA provides a fair number of exceptions that 
exempt rules from the rulemaking requirements.
1. Requirement of a “Rule”
A rulemaking can be required in the first place only if the agency reaches some 
decision that rises to the level of a “rule.”88  The APA definition of a “rule” includes “the 
83
 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553.  Rulemakings carried out under § 553 are referred to as 
“informal” rulemakings.  When a statute requires that a rule be made “on the record,” a “formal” 
rulemaking is conducted under § 556 and § 557 instead.  Id. § 553(c).
84 Id. § 553(b)-(c).
85 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals and the Like—Should 
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.  1311, 1322 (stating requirements for a rule 
to qualify as “legislative”), 1327-28 (1992).
86 Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468-69 (1992).
87 Id. at 1469.
88
 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defines “rule making” as process for formulating, 
amending, or repealing a rule”).   
whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future 
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”89  Courts have generally 
construed this definition broadly “to include nearly every statement an agency may 
make.”90 The rule definition encompasses even seemingly informal agency products, 
such as staff instructions, manuals, question-and-answer bulletins, and press releases.91
The broad scope of the “rule” definition has at times been controversial, however, 
with suggestions that at least a certain level of formality is required for an agency 
statement to qualify as a rule. In a recent concurring opinion in a D.C. Circuit case, 
Judge Silberman questioned the usual breadth accorded to the definition.92 He quoted a 
statement by then-Professor Scalia opining that the lack of any meaningful limiting factor 
in the rule definition is “absurd” and that therefore “the only responsible judicial attitude 
toward this central APA definition is one of benign disregard.”93 Silberman’s own 
opinion was that “[n]ot every utterance, not every speech” by an agency “legitimately can 
be described as a rule,” and “Congress surely meant that an agency statement that serves 
the purpose of a rule is a rule….But any agency statement which does not authoritatively 
seek to answer an underlying policy or legal issue does not fit that criteria.”94  As a 
practical matter, however, not much turns on the designation of rules since courts instead 
89 Id. § 551(4).   The definition also specifically designates certain agency statements to be classified as 
rules: “approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or 
reorganization thereof, prices facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, 
or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.”  Id.
90 Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
91
 Anthony, supra note 85, at 1320.
92 Tozzi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 271 F.3d 301, 312-13 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Silberman, 
J., concurring).
93 Id. at 313 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 383).  
94 Id.
tend to focus on whether one of the express APA exceptions apply and often ignore the 
rule issue altogether.95
Despite the lack of guidance from courts, it seems fairly certain that agency 
decisions to pursue voluntary approaches qualify as rules.  Both decisions to take action 
and refrain from taking action can fall within the rule definition provided that they rise to 
at least a minimal level of formality in the way they are communicated, so decisions to 
implement voluntary approaches may be considered rules whether or not as a substantive 
matter they are considered action.  In establishing voluntary approaches, the agency still 
makes a deliberate decision to “implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy” in a 
certain manner; a choice of a voluntary approach reflects that the agency has made a 
choice at least for the present time among the different policy options, ranging from 
regulation to inaction, for addressing a particular issue.
2. Exceptions to Rulemaking Requirements
When an agency creates a rule, the APA still provides a range of exceptions that 
may exempt the rule from rulemaking requirements.  The exceptions fall into three broad 
categories: exceptions based on the subject matter of the rule, exceptions based on the 
form of the rule, and a flexible “good cause” exception.  The subject matter exceptions 
exempt rules that involve military or foreign affairs, agency management or personnel, 
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.96  The exceptions based on the form 
of the rule apply to “interpretive rules,” “rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
95 See e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S.Ct. 2024 (1993) (concluding that the court did not need to determine 
whether the agency statement was a “rule” because it found the statement to be exempt from notice-and-
comment procedures as a “general statement of policy”); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 
1021 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (attempting to reconcile authorities on “rule” definition but ultimately leaving 
the issue unresolved, concluding “nothing critical turns on whether we initially characterize the Guidance 
as a ‘rule.’”).
96 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
practice,” and importantly for purposes of this paper, “general statements of policy.”97
Finally, the “good cause” exception allows agencies to exempt rules when “the agency 
for good cause finds…that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”98
“General statements of policy” are probably the most important exception for the 
purpose of analyzing voluntary approaches.  This exception is not defined by the APA, 
but courts have developed a doctrine that focuses on the presence of a binding norm to 
determine whether statements fall under the policy statement exception.  One leading 
case, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, described policy 
statements in this way:
A general statement of policy…does not establish a “binding norm.”  It is not 
finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed….A policy 
statement announces the agency’s tentative intentions for the future.  When the 
agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support 
the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.99
Commentators have described the doctrine that has developed surrounding the policy 
statement exception as “tenuous,” “fuzzy,” “blurred,” “baffling,” and “enshrouded in 
considerable smog,” but some general observations still seem possible.100  Importantly 
for the purpose of analyzing voluntary programs, courts have held that the “binding 
norm” may apply not only to the public but also to the agency itself.101 In determining
whether the policy statement contains a norm that binds the agency or the public, courts 
97 Id. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
98 Id. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(b).
99 Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
100 Anthony, supra note 85 at 1321.
101 See CropLife Am. v. E.P.A., 329 F.3d 876, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (court should determine “whether the 
agency action binds private parties or the agency itself with the ‘force of law’”), quoting, Gen. Elec. v. 
E.P.A., 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
have looked to both the intent of the agency as expressed in the statement, as well as to 
any practical binding effect the agency gives the statement.102
Given that the lack of a binding norm is the essential characteristic of a policy 
statement, voluntary approaches might at first glance seem by their very definition to be 
policy statements, but a closer analysis shows that the question is uncertain. Clearly, 
voluntary approaches by definition do not contain norms that bind the public, but if 
agencies are found to bind themselves through voluntary approaches, they will not 
qualify for the policy statement exception.  The most commonly followed test for 
determining whether an agency statement contains a binding norm seems to come from 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Bus Association v. United States which set out 
two criteria: 1) whether a statement acts prospectively, and 2) “whether a purported 
statement genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise 
discretion.”103  However, this test will not even have relevance if the agency is viewed as 
not taking any action at all through voluntary approaches.  Then the statement could have 
neither present nor prospective effect, and there could be no binding of the agency’s 
discretion because the agency would not be taking any action.  If the agency is seen as 
taking no action, then there is nothing to which the agency can be bound, and the policy 
statement exception applies due to the lack of a binding norm.  But if the agency is seen 
as taking action, then it becomes possible that the agency may bind itself in how it carries 
102 The D.C. Circuit in 2003 recognized that  “case law reflects two related formulations for determining 
whether a challenged action constitutes a regulation or merely a statement of policy.”  “One line of analysis 
focuses on the effects of the agency action, while “[t]he second line of analysis focuses on the agency’s 
expressed intentions.”  Id.
103 William Funk, When is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules 
and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 662 (2002) (observing that case seems to be most generally 
followed); American Bus Association v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529  (D.C. Cir. 1980).
out that action, such that a binding norm will exist and the policy statement exception 
will not apply. 
There are different types of agency decisions related to voluntary approaches that 
might be considered action, including the initial choice to encourage voluntary efforts in 
furtherance of a particular environmental policy objective, the formulation of specific 
approaches for facilitating voluntary efforts, and the granting of incentives to 
participants.   If the choice to pursue a voluntary approach is viewed as action, it could 
conceivably have a binding effect upon the agency.  When agencies announce to the 
public that they will pursue voluntary approaches, they apparently commit themselves at 
least for an indefinite period to the use of that policy approach in furtherance of the 
environmental objective and to taking the actions necessary to implement the approach, 
such as allocating resources to the program and providing incentives.  If the program is 
intended to be immediately established, there is a prospective effect, and the agency’s
discretion is also bound at least in a practical sense by its commitment to administer the 
program.  
Decisions made by agencies in the course of implementing voluntary approaches 
may also have a prospective effect and bind the agency’s discretion.  For example, the 
rulemaking currently underway to amend the DOE’s voluntary registry would meet these 
criteria, since once completed, the agency will follow those guidelines and apply them 
consistently to entities reporting emissions.  The administration of incentives by agencies 
may also have the effect of binding the agency, depending on how concrete the benefits 
are and how consistently the agency applies them.  For example, one could imagine that 
if a company’s product meets the Energy Star standards, yet the agency denies a label, 
the company might argue that the agency is bound by its standards.  A prospective effect 
and a binding of the agency discretion with respect to incentives will sometimes be 
necessary again to attract participants, since they will want to be assured of the benefits 
they will receive in return for voluntary efforts.  Consistency will also sometimes be 
necessary to achieve the environmental objectives of the program.  For example, in order 
for the Energy Star label to have meaning to consumers, agencies must adhere to 
consistent standards in allowing the label to be displayed.  Other times, however, 
voluntary programs may provide benefits that do not carry such specific expectations in 
their application, such as public recognition through press releases or opportunities for 
cooperative efforts, that would not translate easily into policies that bind the agency.
Further insight on the application of the policy statement exception to voluntary 
approaches may come from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lincoln v. Vigil, which
found an agency’s decision to be subject to the policy statement exception in
circumstances similar to those that that occur when voluntary programs are established.104
This case concerned review of a decision by the Indian Health Service to terminate a 
program that provided services to handicapped Indian children in the Southwest in order 
to reallocate resources to a national program.105 The Court unanimously found that the 
agency’s decision to terminate the program was “surely” a “general statement of policy”
and therefore not subject to notice-and-comment requirements.106  The court 
characterized the action as an “announcement…that an agency will discontinue a 
discretionary allocation of unrestricted funds from a lump-sum appropriation” and cited a 
previous case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, for the proposition that 
104 Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S.Ct. 2024 (1993).
105 Id. at 2026.
106 Id. at 2034.
“decisions to expend otherwise unrestricted funds are not, without more, subject to the 
notice-and-comment requirements of § 553.”107  The factual setting of the case is similar 
to that which occurs when agencies establish voluntary programs --  as in Lincoln v. Vigil
the agency makes a decision to use its resources for a program that will promote 
particular objectives in a manner that does not impose obligations on regulated parties.
Although the court focused on the allocation of resources as the significant aspect of the 
agency’s action, the agency’s decision contained real substantive content in that 
significant benefits to Indian children were withdrawn and redistributed.  The benefits
administered through the program terminated had a much more direct and substantive 
impact on certain parties than do the incentives of most voluntary programs, which might 
suggest that voluntary approaches are even stronger candidates for the policy statement 
exception. However, important differences also exist between the decision to reallocate 
funds in this case and decisions to establish voluntary approaches.  In Lincoln v. Vigil, the 
agency was not changing its commitment towards a particular policy objective (helping 
handicapped Indian children) or the essential manner in which it furthered that objective 
(providing direct services to children); the agency only decided to change the scope of the 
action.  Therefore, an agency’s decision to pursue a particular environmental policy 
objective and its choice of approach for pursuing the objective might be considered to 
establish a new binding norm, unlike the agency action in Lincoln v. Vigil.
In addition to the policy statement exception, the subject matter exceptions under 
the APA that exempt agencies from rulemakings may also have relevance to voluntary 
approaches.  The “grants” and “benefits” exceptions have the potential to apply the most 
frequently.  For example, the DOI’s conservation initiatives provide grants to fund 
107 Id., citing, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
voluntary efforts.  These programs would seem to straightforwardly qualify for the grants 
exception.  Analysis of the benefits exception, however, may prove more complicated.  
The non-grant incentives that agencies give to facilitate voluntary efforts might seem to 
qualify as “benefits.”  But benefits that have been traditionally encompassed by the 
exception seem to comprise mostly of monetary payments provided to persons based on 
their personal status, such as government employment benefits and Social Security 
benefits, rather than the types of incentives employed by voluntary programs.108  There 
would also be a question of how tangible the benefit must be in order to qualify for the 
exception.  Even if the right to display an Energy Star label is considered a benefit, what 
about unspecified assurances of public recognition of greenhouse gas reductions?  
Furthermore, the benefits and grants exception has been justified on the ground that, “[i]f 
the government wishes to impose restrictions, the recipients can avoid restrictions by not 
accepting the grant or benefit; and if the government wishes to terminate the grant or 
benefit, the recipient had no right to it and thus is not entitled to a voice in whether it is 
terminated.”109  If this is the rationale  behind the exception, exempting benefits programs 
because the public has no “right” to the benefit would seem unpersuasive in the context 
of voluntary approaches where achieving environmental goals, rather than providing 
benefits to participants, is the primary purpose of the program.  The effect of applying the 
exception in such circumstances would be to deny the public participation in decisions on 
how to address environmental policy concerns because the approach incidentally 
included incentives that rose to the level of “benefits.”
3. Agency Practice
108 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, 
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It is worth asking how agencies themselves view their obligations to hold 
rulemakings for voluntary approaches.  Agency statements frequently reflect an 
assumption that rulemakings are not necessary for “voluntary” or “non-regulatory” 
approaches to implement policy.  For example, a recent Federal Register notice stated, 
“we are considering best how to accomplish this through actions that do not involve 
rulemaking or other regulatory methods,” and a list of example “non-regulatory” 
programs followed that included such programs as Energy Star and Project XL (which is 
not even a purely voluntary program as defined by this Paper).110   Another recent 
statement in the Federal Register announced, “Instead of a rulemaking, the Coast Guard 
will proceed with establishing this voluntary experimental approval program using a 
Coast Guard circular,” while another queried, “Should the Agency initiate rulemaking to 
adopt the guidelines as regulations or will the guidelines be sufficiently effective if they 
are only voluntary?”111  These statements came from such diverse agencies as the EPA, 
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Agriculture.
Rulemakings to implement voluntary approaches do still occur.  One noteworthy
example is the rulemaking currently being held by the Department of Energy to revise the 
voluntary greenhouse gas reporting system under Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy 
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Act, as directed by President Bush’s climate change policy.112  A reasonable inference is 
perhaps that agencies are more likely to hold rulemakings when they are implementing 
specific statutory mandates, such as in 1605(b), as opposed to when they are creating 
voluntary programs pursuant to broad statutory authority.  For example, in contrast to 
1605(b)’s specific mandate, Section 103 of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to 
“develop, evaluate, and demonstrate non regulatory strategies and technologies for air 
pollution prevention.”113  These two statutes also provide arguably different public 
participation requirements: 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act requires “opportunity for 
public comment,” while Section 103 of the Clean Air Act instead requires “opportunities 
for participation by industry, public interest groups, scientists, and other interested 
persons.”114
Rulemakings, of course, are not the entire universe of ways in which agencies can 
facilitate public participation.  There are many other methods agencies can use that are 
less formal than the notice-and-comment process.  Both the EPA and DOI have policies 
that encourage agency decision makers to provide meaningful public participation 
opportunities above and beyond statutory requirements.115  Actions serving those 
purposes may take a variety of forms, including press releases, mailings, public meetings, 
hearings, workshops, and informal communications.116   The informal public 
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participation actions may serve a variety of purposes, ranging from one-way sharing of 
information by the agency to the solicitation and incorporation of public opinion into the 
decision-making process.  Therefore, the public may still be involved in the 
implementation of voluntary programs even when no rulemaking takes place.  For 
example, the Climate Leaders program has issued press releases, made its Draft Protocols 
available for public comment, and held meetings with corporations who have signed on 
as partners.117 When the APA requirements do not apply, however, the level of public 
participation that occurs is subject to the complete discretion of the agency.118  Agency 
decision makers may choose whether public participation is desirable or feasible at all 
considering the nature of the action and budget and time constraints, and if so, which 
actions or decisions to open to the public, what level of participation to allow, and which 
parties to allow to participate.
B. Application of Substantive Judicial Review Requirements
In addition to participation in the creation of policy through rulemakings, 
members of the public may also seek to influence agency decision making through 
substantive judicial review pursuant to Section 702 of the APA.  Parties might challenge 
agency decisions related to voluntary approaches for a variety of reasons.  They might 
disagree with the choice to refrain from issuing mandatory regulations or take issue with 
a decision made in the course of implementing the program, such as the goals or 
standards established.  Program participants might seek to challenge the agency’s 
decision not to award benefits thought to be due in return for voluntary efforts. A
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competitor of companies participating in the program might seek to invalidate the entire 
program in order to prevent the participating companies from gaining a market edge as a 
result of agency recognition.
The characterization of voluntary approaches as “action” or “inaction” has 
important implications for the availability of substantive judicial review.  If the decision 
to use a voluntary approach is viewed as inaction, then the availability of substantive 
judicial review under the APA is limited to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed.”119  A court would therefore only be able to provide a remedy 
when the agency’s failure to issue a mandatory rule directly violates a statutory directive, 
so judicial review will rarely be available.  If the entire program is considered inaction, 
other decisions made in the course of implementing the program will also be sheltered 
from judicial review.  In contrast, if there is found to be agency “action,” then courts have 
broader authority to review for agency decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”120
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that at least one type of agency 
inaction is committed to agency discretion by law.  The Court established a presumption 
in Heckler v. Chaney that decisions not to take enforcement action are immune from 
judicial review under Section 701(a)(2) of the APA.121 The concurrence to the case also 
established several caveats to the presumption against reviewability, observing that the 
Court did not hold that review was not available in cases where, rather than declining to 
enforce in a single case, an agency claims it has no statutory jurisdiction to enforce, 
“engages in a pattern of nonenforcement of clear statutory language,” or refuses to 
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enforce a regulation in effect.122  However, the issue of agency enforcement analyzed in 
Chaney is different from the type of inaction involved in decisions to use voluntary 
approaches, since the very decision not to enforce requires that there must have already 
been some mandatory controls in place.  Non-enforcement may be a practical issue when 
the complaint is that the agency has relied on voluntary approaches rather than enforcing 
mandatory laws and regulations already created,123 but plaintiffs will not be able to 
directly challenge an agency’s pattern of non-enforcement by challenging the agency’s 
choice to use a voluntary approach.  
Instead, the type of “inaction” likely to be at issue in review of  voluntary 
approaches is the failure of the agency to issue mandatory regulations.  Parties who are 
dissatisfied with agency reliance on voluntary efforts could petition the agency to hold a 
rulemaking to consider the need for mandatory regulations under Section 553(e) of the 
APA which provides that “[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right to 
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”124  The right to petition is 
available without regard to the nature of the action being sought or actions that the 
agency has already taken, but the APA provides the right only to petition the agency and 
does not require that agencies carry out the petition’s request or even respond to the 
petition.  Petitioners may seek judicial review of agency denials of petitions for 
rulemaking, but courts have extended a great deal of deference to agencies in such cases.  
D.C. Circuit opinions have observed the “extremely limited, highly deferential scope” of 
review of agency refusals to hold rulemakings, a deference that is so broad as to “make 
122
 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839.
123
 For example, environmentalists might complain that the Interior Department, rather than enforcing the 
Endangered Species Act diligently, has instead diverted attention and resources to the voluntary 
conservation approaches.
124
 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553(e).
the process akin to non-reviewability.”125  Such deference stems from a policy that 
agencies rather than courts are best suited to determine how to allocate their limited 
resources in furtherance of their mission.  The D.C. Circuit has held that Chaney
presumption against review of agency inaction does not extend to review of agency 
refusals to hold rulemakings, although it observed that Chaney reinforced the highly 
deferential standard applied in reviewing agency decisions to not hold rulemakings.126
Even if an agency decision to rely on voluntary efforts is conceived of as 
“action,” the unique characteristics of these approaches will still present further hurdles 
to parties seeking judicial review.  The APA makes reviewable only “final” agency action 
and not “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate” action.127 Whether the finality 
requirement is satisfied will depend on which “action” the court looks to in making its 
determination.  If the action is considered to be the agency’s initial decision to establish a 
voluntary program, the finality requirement will probably be satisfied, since there will be 
no further steps necessary to complete that decision.   Decisions rendered by an agency 
respecting the administration of incentives in individual cases also would also likely be 
considered final after the benefit is granted or once the agency indicates that the decision 
not to grant a benefit is no longer open for discussion.  However, those challenging
general aspects of the approach might find it more difficult to satisfy the finality 
requirement.   Given the experimental purpose of many voluntary approaches, they will 
be constantly adapting and changing, and it therefore might not easily follow that an 
agency’s precise original conception of the approach would be considered “final.” In 
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addition, if the agency action is viewed as a decision to pursue a voluntary rather than a 
mandatory approach, this decision may be difficult to characterize as “final” since the 
agency can claim that it is still keeping an open mind to mandatory regulation and the 
decision to pursue a voluntary approach will have no bearing on that decision.
Courts may also find that decisions establishing voluntary approaches are 
“committed to agency discretion by law” under the meaning of Section 701(a)(2).   The  
Court held in Chaney held that enforcement decisions generally fall into this category of 
immunity, but other types of agency decisions may also be sheltered from judicial 
review.  Specifically, decisions allocating funds from lump-sum appropriations are 
another category that courts have traditionally considered as committed to agency 
discretion that may have implications for voluntary approaches.  This was the basis for 
the court’s conclusion in Lincoln v. Vigil that the agency’s decision to terminate funding 
for a regional program in favor of a national one was committed to the agency’s 
discretion, since such decisions are viewed as “peculiarly” within the agency’s 
expertise.128  The commitment of budgetary decisions to agency discretion may have 
implications for the establishment of voluntary programs, because one of most important 
choices an agency make is the devotion of resources to facilitating the voluntary efforts.  
However, as discussed above with respect to Lincoln v. Vigil, the agency is making other 
important decisions in addition to budgetary allocation, such as the decisions to pursue a 
particular environmental policy objective and to use a voluntary approach for that 
purpose, so the designation of resources alone probably should not cause the agency’s 
decision to be unreviewable.
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Standing requirements under the APA may also be a significant obstacle.  The 
Supreme Court has held that the minimum constitutional requirements of standing consist 
of three elements: the plaintiff must show a particularized “injury in fact,” a “causal 
connection” between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and the redressability of the 
injury by a favorable court decision.129 These requirements may cause difficulty for 
plaintiffs challenging voluntary approaches, especially for environmental plaintiffs.  The 
Supreme Court has strictly interpreted the particularized injury requirement in 
environmental cases, holding, for example, that a plaintiff did not suffer a particularized 
injury from agency action impacting an area that the plaintiff had visited and planned to 
return to at some unspecified time.130   The injury and causal connection to the agency’s 
conduct will be even more difficult to show in challenges by environmental plaintiffs to 
voluntary approaches.  First, plaintiffs will likely need to show that they are being 
personally injured by the environmental harm that the voluntary approach seeks to 
address.  But voluntary environmental efforts will not themselves injure anyone, so 
plaintiffs would further have to show that they would have been better off had the agency 
adopted some different approach.  The redressability requirement will also create 
complications because it is not clear what remedy the court could provide that would 
directly address the proffered injury -- simply invalidating the voluntary program would 
not address the injury, but the court will probably not go as far as to tell the agency which 
approach to adopt.  Participants in voluntary programs who seek to challenge not the 
agency’s policy decision but rather individualized decisions regarding the conferral of 
incentives will likely find it easier than environmental plaintiffs to satisfy standing 
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requirements.  If the agency denies a benefit to a program participant, for example, the 
injury involved to the plaintiff is more direct and can be easily redressed by a court 
ordering the agency to confer the benefit.
IV. Resolving the Paradox: Ensuring Appropriate Public Participation for Voluntary 
Approaches
The legal characterization of voluntary approaches still remains an open question, 
and the resolution of that question will have important consequences for public 
participation rights under the APA.  For those that view mandatory regulation as the only 
true type of agency “action” for addressing environmental problems, voluntary 
approaches are the equivalent of inaction.  Yet agencies have devoted time and resources 
to these efforts and asked the public to place faith in them as responses to important 
environmental issues.  This section argues that in characterizing these approaches under 
the APA, courts should  resolve ambiguities by looking towards the agency’s public 
portrayal of the voluntary program, which will often lead to a finding of agency “action.”  
Similarly, when determining whether the agency’s action contains a “binding norm,” 
courts should look to the political binding effects of the agency’s action as well as the 
private effects.  These resolutions are logical adaptations of the current doctrine to the 
unique characteristics of voluntary approaches, will allow appropriate public participation 
in important policy choices, and will alleviate accountability concerns by ensuing that 
agencies take consistent positions in public and in court.
A. The Importance of Public Participation for Voluntary Approaches
The issue of how voluntary approaches should be characterized for purposes of 
the public participation rights provided by the APA carries important consequences .  
Rulemakings serve to legitimate decisions by unaccountable agencies through a 
replication of the legislative process in which all affected constituencies have the 
opportunity to express their views.131  Accountability concerns are thus raised when 
important environmental policy decisions are not subject to notice-and-comment
requirements.  The diverse perspectives and careful deliberation that result from 
rulemakings also serve to increase the quality of agency decisions, and bypassing this 
process on important issues may result in agency decisions that are one-sided or not 
adequately considered.  Substantive judicial review of agency decisions also is an 
important means of public participation.  Through judicial review, members of the public 
may enlist the courts to ensure that agencies do not act in ways that are arbitrary, abusive 
of their discretion, or contrary to law.132
The DOE’s rulemaking to amend guidelines for the voluntary reporting of 
greenhouse gases provides a real-world example of the potential value of public 
participation for voluntary approaches.  As of March 2004, over one hundred parties had 
responded to the DOE’s request for comments, encompassing a wide range of entities 
such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the World Resources Institute, the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, General Motors, the American Petroleum Institute, and 
the Business Council for Sustainable Energy.133  The comments submitted also include a 
diverse range of views and topics, from rejection of a voluntary approach for addressing 
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climate change altogether to many narrower suggestions for making the reporting scheme 
more workable.134  The DOE rulemaking brings to light the range of purposes that 
rulemakings for voluntary approaches may serve, such as the opportunity for parties to 
express the view that a mandatory approach is preferable, broad representation in the 
setting of goals for the initiative, and the sharing of knowledge on how to increase the 
effectiveness of the program.
Concerns associated with a lack of public participation for voluntary approaches 
arise with respect to individual policy choices and more broadly, to the potential void in 
public participation that may result from a large-scale shift to voluntary approaches.  Not
every government action to encourage voluntary environmental efforts raises policy 
concerns, and in fact most actions will not.  To the extent that agencies may be useful in 
facilitating beyond-compliance behavior, this is obviously a positive environmental good 
and should be encouraged rather than burdened through expensive, time-consuming 
rulemakings and litigation.  The experimental, innovative value of these programs would 
indeed be substantially hindered if agencies were forced to lock in certain approaches that 
could only be changed through further rulemakings, and the burden of rulemaking 
requirements would seem disproportionate to the value of most of the relatively small-
scale projects, deterring agencies from initiating such efforts in the first place. The most 
significant policy concern instead arises when agencies utilize voluntary approaches as 
comprehensive responses to environmental problems to the exclusion of mandatory 
approaches, even where there is legal authority to exercise regulatory control, and this 
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decision to favor a voluntary over a mandatory approach is not subject to notice-and-
comment or judicial review.  The use of voluntary approaches may then serve to shield 
controversial environmental issues from public scrutiny; the Administration will be able 
to claim that it is taking action on issues through voluntary approaches, but the spotlight 
on particular agency actions that normally ensues from rulemakings will be avoided and 
judicial review will not be possible.
If the reverse were occurring, that is, if agencies were considering mandatory 
regulations, parties would almost always have the opportunity through rulemakings to 
offer their view that the agency should utilize a voluntary approach instead.  In fact, there 
is one circumstance in which consideration of non-regulatory approaches as possible 
alternatives to mandatory regulation actually is required.  Executive Order 12,866, more 
generally known as President Clinton’s reform of the regulatory process, directs agencies 
to “identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing 
economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable 
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.”135  In 
other words, the Order generally requires agencies to consider non-regulatory alternatives 
when developing convention regulation.  But no corresponding legal obligation exists for 
the development of non-regulatory approaches, which agencies may implement without 
ever considering whether “direct regulation” would better address the issue of concern.  
A stark asymmetry thus exists in which the law implicitly favors non-regulatory 
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approaches: comparison of mandatory and voluntary approaches is required before 
agencies can promulgate mandatory regulations, but not only is such a comparison not 
required before the implementation of voluntary approaches, the public has no right to 
even bring such an issue to the attention of the agency through a rulemaking.136
An absence of public participation in decisions establishing voluntary approaches 
will generally benefit targets of regulation and disadvantage beneficiaries of regulation.  
The optimal outcome for regulated parties will usually be an agency decision in favor of 
voluntary standards.  That is the outcome that would automatically occur if no 
rulemaking takes place, so environmental advocates in favor of mandatory regulations 
would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by arguing their position in a 
rulemaking or in court.  Without allowing public participation in decisions to enact 
voluntary policies, the regulated parties in a sense have it both ways – when there is a 
possibility of mandatory requirements being imposed, they will generally be assured of a 
rulemaking because a “binding norm” will be created, but when the agency is inclined to 
use voluntary approaches instead, the public has no right to challenge that choice.
Concerns would also be raised if decisions made in the course of implementing 
the policy are excluded from public participation.  One important decision, for example, 
would be the goals in pollution reduction or other measures of environmental benefits 
that the program seeks to attain.  Such goals, although non-binding, are important both 
because they affect the level of action that the agency will encourage program 
participants to take and because the success of the program will be measured against 
these goals.  For example, President Bush’s climate policy set a goal of reducing the 
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“greenhouse intensity” of the United States economy by eighteen percent over the next 
ten years, a goal that environmental advocates have vehemently protested as misleading 
and inadequate.137  It may seem as though participation in setting such standards is 
insignificant, since there is no real legal force behind them, but when voluntary 
approaches are substituted for mandatory approaches based on the assumption that they 
will be just as effective, then it must also be accepted that the goals set by these program 
are just as important as the standards set in mandatory regulations.
Even more fundamentally, the largest concerns arise when looking beyond 
isolated decisions by agencies to pursue voluntary approaches to the much broader 
picture of what may happen in light of the overall trend in environmental policy towards 
use of voluntary approaches.  Such a shift has the potential to create a huge deficit in 
public participation.  Since the cooperation of the parties with the potential to inflict 
environmental damage is necessary to the success of voluntary approaches, the real losers 
from the lack of rulemaking requirements would be the public interest advocates.  The 
agency will out of necessity be in constant contact with the private entities to sustain their 
participation in voluntary efforts.  The cooperation of the private entities is essential to 
the success of voluntary programs, while involvement from public interest 
representatives is not.  Over time, without legal requirements that the agency consider 
views of public interest representatives, a two-dimensional relationship between the 
agency and private interests is likely to emerge in which public interest representatives 
are shut out, raising heightened agency capture concerns.  The quality of environmental 
policy decisions will also suffer from the lack of a diverse range of views presented to 
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agencies.  Most important, the rulemaking process will not serve its important function of 
legitimizing the decisions of unaccountable agencies through democratic dialogue, courts 
will not be able to check agency discretion, and major constituencies will have a role in 
environmental policy decisions only when agencies decide to allow their participation.
B. Proposed Principle of Interpretation
Rather than leaving a large vacuum in public participation rights as the voluntary 
approach paradigm continues to gain ground, the law must respond to the open question 
of how voluntary approaches should be characterized for purposes of the APA.  The 
greatest threat to accountability would occur if voluntary approaches are characterized as 
“inaction” for purposes of public participation under the APA, even while the 
Administration contradicts this position by maintaining that it is taking genuine action to 
address environmental problems through voluntary approaches. The Administration and 
agency officials have often promoted voluntary approaches as genuine, substantive 
answers to pressing environmental concerns such as climate change and habitat 
conservation.  It would be hypocritical for proponents of these programs to suggest that 
they are equivalent to complete inaction.  Agencies should therefore not have the option 
of taking a contradictory position that allows them to receive the political benefits of 
publicly proclaiming solutions to environmental problems yet avoid the public scrutiny of 
their policy choices that would come from rulemakings.  Therefore, when agencies 
publicly portray voluntary approaches as “action” the government is taking in response to 
environmental problems, the voluntary approach should be also considered as action for 
purposes of the APA.
Looking towards the agency’s portrayal of the voluntary approach will provide 
guidance in determining whether the agency decision in question is a policy statement 
and thus exempt from rulemaking requirements.   As discussed previously, although the 
lack of a “binding norm” is the essential characteristic of a policy statement, the question 
cannot even be asked unless there is some action to which the agency could potentially 
bind itself.  If according to the agency’s portrayal there was no action, then the analysis 
will end there with the conclusion that the decision is a policy statement exempt from 
rulemaking requirements.  If there is found to be action, however, the analysis may 
proceed to the question of whether the action establishes a binding norm on the agency. 
In the doctrine surrounding the policy statement exception, courts have given 
weight to whether the agency expressed an intention to create a binding norm, but have 
also been willing to look beyond the agency’s intent to any practical binding effects of 
the agency statement.138  By not subjecting its decision to notice-and-comment, it may be 
inferred that the agency did not intend to create a binding norm, but in this context also 
the court should also look beyond the agency’s subjective intent.  The analysis of whether 
there has been a practical binding effect should acknowledge that the decision to pursue a 
voluntary approach may have an important binding effect on the agency – a political 
effect.  When courts consider whether the agency has bound itself, it is typically 
considering this issue with respect to the agency’s legal control over private parties.  For 
example, if the agency established a policy for under which circumstances it would 
enforce a legal requirement, a private party that was the target of enforcement in 
circumstances other than what was indicated in the policy might argue that the agency is 
bound to its policy.  Participants in rulemakings, however, are of much broader 
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composition than only the members of the public directly affected by the regulation.  The 
effect of a binding norm acts as  a legal hook which triggers a rulemaking requirement 
that allows all interested parties to participate in the formulation of the policy.  Important 
policy choices made by agencies affect more than the would-be targets of regulation.  
This is why both the targets of regulation and the beneficiaries of regulation, such as 
environmental public interest advocates, regularly participate in rulemakings, and 
rulemakings are rightly open to all “interested persons.”139  The APA protects the right of 
participation by more than those who are directly bound by the proposed regulation, yet 
since most agency decisions do affect private rights, this tension does not usually arise.  
Voluntary approaches bring this tension to the forefront – individual rights will often not 
be legally affected by voluntary approaches, yet the interest in public participation is still 
present.  
There sometimes will in fact be practical binding effects on agencies with respect
to private parties when the agency administers incentives, but when these types of effects
are not significant enough, the doctrine should broaden to recognize that other practical 
binding effects are created in a political sense.  For example, a decision to establish a 
voluntary approach is also a decision that private parties will not be bound.  This can be 
just as significant a decision for parties fearful of regulation as a decision to regulate.  
While in theory an agency could still decide to regulate parties soon after the 
establishment of a voluntary policy, the practical effect often is to send a political signal 
that the Administration has decided not to regulate.  For example, by announcing his 
climate change policy publicly and as a comprehensive set of initiatives, President Bush 
gave the impression that the Administration had made a definitive choice regarding its 
139
 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553(c).
policy for addressing climate change and would not be revisiting the issue any time soon.  
The agency also often binds itself politically in other ways through the announcement of 
voluntary approaches by acknowledging that there is an environmental issue of concern, 
expressing its decision that a voluntary approach is the appropriate way to respond, and 
committing itself to taking certain actions towards facilitating voluntary efforts.  The 
same policy issues that bring environmental advocate to rulemakings are implicated from 
this type of agency binding as when the agency binds itself with respect to private parties .  
Sometimes, however, the agency will not have bound itself through the establishment of 
a voluntary approach, because it will be clear that the program is being used merely as a 
temporary or experimental approach, with the possibility that it may at any time be 
superseded by a different approach.  In such cases, when voluntary programs are merely 
used as stepping stones for gathering information or developing policy, the agency will 
not have politically bound itself to any particular approach, and it is justifiable to treat the 
decision as a policy statement.
In the judicial review context, the characterization of the decision related to a
voluntary approach as action or inaction will largely depend upon how the plaintiff 
chooses to frame the issue.  If the injury claimed is the failure of the agency to carry out 
an action such as issuing mandatory regulations or holding a rulemaking, then the issue is 
properly treated as review of inaction under Section 706(1).140  If instead, the party is 
challenging an “action” actually carried out in the course of implementing the approach, 
such as the decision to grant a benefit or the choice of approach itself, then review should 
take place under the broader Section 706(2) standard.141  There are, however, some 
140 Id. §706(1).
141 Id. §706(2).
caveats that should be observed related to the agency’s portrayal of the approach in 
judicial review cases.  If a party challenges the agency decision as action, and the agency 
has itself publicly portrayed the approach as action as described above, then the agency 
should not be able to claim as a defense in court that the approach is the equivalent of 
inaction.  Another special circumstance also would arise if a party challenges the inaction 
of the agency’s refusal to undertake a rulemaking.  When agencies have portrayed action 
to the public, then the decision not to hold a rulemaking should not be analyzed as 
inaction but as a “rule” already created, with the court’s analysis instead focusing on 
whether that rule was subject to rulemaking requirements.  Although review of agency 
decisions not to hold rulemakings is generally highly deferential, such deference would 
be misplaced when the court’s assumption that it is reviewing agency inaction rather than 
action when that assumption is contradicted by the agency’s public portrayal of the 
approach.  
Broader awareness of the public participation concerns associated with voluntary 
approaches also is necessary.  Agencies have a role to play.  They may mitigate the 
public participation concern by making efforts to use genuinely inclusive public 
participation procedures when deciding to use voluntary approaches, even if rulemakings 
are not used.  In the broader policy debate over voluntary approaches as well, more 
efforts are necessary to incorporate public participation concerns.  Both critics and 
advocates of voluntary approaches should expand their analysis beyond the 
environmental effectiveness of these approaches to consideration of the public 
participation issues they raise.  

